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SHORT ABSTRACT 
 
In this work we reevaluate and elaborate Crick-Mitchison's proposal that REM-sleep 
corresponds to a self-organized process for unlearning attractors in neural networks. This 
reformulation is made at the face of recent findings concerning the intense activation of the 
amygdalar complex during REM-sleep, the involvement of endocannabinoids in synaptic 
weakening and new neural network models with itinerant associative dynamics. We distinguish 
between a neurological REM-sleep function and a related evolutionary/behavioral dreaming 
function. At the neurological level, we propose that REM-sleep regulates excessive plasticity 
and weakens over stable brain activation patterns, especially in the amygdala, hippocampus and 
motor systems. At the behavioral level, we propose that dream narrative evolved as exploratory 
behavior made in a virtual environment promoting “emotional (un)learning”, that is, habituation 
of emotional responses, anxiety and fear.  Several predictions of the unlearning idea that are at 
variance with the memory consolidation hypothesis are discussed. 
 
LONG ABSTRACT 
 
In this work we reevaluate and elaborate Crick-Mitchison's proposal that REM-sleep 
corresponds to a self-organized process for unlearning attractors in neural networks. This 
reformulation is made at the face of recent findings concerning the intense activation of the 
amygdalar complex during REM-sleep, the involvement of endocannabinoids in synaptic 
weakening and new neural network models with itinerant associative dynamics. We distinguish 
between a neurological REM-sleep function and a related evolutionary/behavioral dreaming 
function. At the neurological level, we propose that REM-sleep regulates excessive plasticity 
and weakens over stable brain activation patterns, especially in the amygdala, hippocampus and 
motor systems by over activating the cannabinoid system. This proposal is motivated by the 
high density of endocannabinoid receptor CB1 in regions highly active during REM, the high 
level and efficiency of endocannabinoids during sleep and unlearning-like effects of CB1 
receptor activation. At the behavioral level, we propose that dream narrative evolved as 
exploratory behavior made in a virtual environment promoting “emotional (un)learning”, that is, 
optimization of emotional responses, fear learning and anxiety level. Several predictions of the 
unlearning idea that are at variance with the memory consolidation hypothesis are discussed. 
Our proposal is illustrated by an itinerant associative memory model (a Hopfield model with 
transition between attractors and self-organized unlearning dynamics) that mimics William 
James’ dynamical ideas about the stream of thought. 
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Taking a purely naturalistic view of the matter, it seems reasonable to suppose that, unless 
consciousness served some useful purpose, it would not have been superadded to life. Assuming 
hypothetically that this is so, there results an important problem for psycho-physicists to find 
out, namely, how consciousness helps an animal, how much complication of machinery may be 
saved in the nervous centres, for instance, if consciousness accompany their action (William 
James). 
 
In dreaming processes man exercises himself for his future life (Frederich Nietzsche). 
 
I. Introduction 
 
One century after Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1899) neuropsychologists 
cannot yet answer if dreams should be interpreted. Although probably there are as many 
theories about dream function as dream researchers, recent advances in neuroimaging, 
neurobiology and computational neuroscience have contributed to a more focused study of 
dreams and their main neurological correlate  Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep.  Here we 
follow Hobson and McCarley (1977) and define dreams as a mental experience, occurring in 
sleep, which is characterized by hallucinoid imagery, predominantly visual and often vivid; by 
bizarre elements due to such spatiotemporal distortions as condensation, discontinuity, and 
acceleration; and by a delusional acceptance of these phenomena as “real” at the time that 
they occur. We assume the conventional correlation between REM-sleep and strong dreaming 
experience (Hobson et al. 2000), although a strict correspondence is not crucial for our 
purposes.  
 
There are two kinds of questions relative to REM-sleep and dreams. The first are 
neurophysiologic questions: what are the mechanisms related to REM-sleep generation, what 
brain regions are activated or inhibited, what neurotransmitters are involved, what mechanism 
produces motor paralysis during REM-sleep etc. Today, we have a large, although incomplete, 
body of knowledge of this kind (McCarley 1998; Hobson et al. 2000; Stickgold et al. 2001). 
The second type refers to functional (or perhaps evolutionary) questions. Why do mammals and 
birds have REM-sleep but other animals do not?  Why so much REM-sleep activity occurs in 
the fetus and newborn? Are the functions of REM-sleep and dreams the same? What is the 
function of dreams after all?  
 
We can invalidate this last question by making the skeptical proposal that dreams have no 
function. After all, although cardiac contractions have the function of blood pumping, cardiac 
sounds probably do not have any functional meaning. So, dreams could be the brain analogue of 
cardiac sounds, an epiphenomenon of brain periodic activation during sleep. Notwithstanding 
this possibility, the search for some functional role not only for REM-sleep but also for dream 
narrative continues. William James's evolutionary argument that consciousness should have 
some function is not logically conclusive but continues to be “reasonable” if one substitutes 
“consciousness” by “dreams = consciousness during sleep”. 
 
The activation-synthesis model of Hobson and McCarley (1977) and the activation-input-
modulation model of Hobson et al. (2000) are examples of mostly descriptive, not functional, 
accounts. These authors emphasized the endogenous activation of the forebrain by the Pons-
Geniculate-Occipital (PGO) waves during REM-sleep and correlated the activation of specific 
brain regions (visual cortex, motor system, vestibular system etc.) to typical dream contents. 
They also proposed that the dream narrative emerges as a tentative and partial synthesis, 
elaborated in higher associative centers, of such stormy activation. Although Hobson (Hobson 
et al. 2000) and McCarley (1998) give a detailed account of REM-sleep mechanisms, especially 
the possible relevance of aminergic/adrenergic balance, and do a wonderful job by correlating 
brain states with dream phenomenology, they have little to offer for dream/REM function, 
suggesting some kind of periodic reactivation necessary to the maintenance of poorly used 
memories and neural circuits (McCarley 1998), or some kind of reprocessing of novel cortical 
associations (Hobson et al. 2000). 
 
Jouvet advanced the hypothesis that REM-sleep has developmental functions related to the 
imprinting of genetic behavioral programs into the neural architecture (Jouvet 1999). In a 
similar way, Changeaux and Danchin (1976) suggested a relation between REM-sleep and 
synaptic stabilization during development. In both hypotheses, adult dreams are possibly non-
functional vestiges from developmental mechanisms (Changeaux 1985) although a similar 
function to be performed on the mature brain is conceivable (Jouvet 1999). We call this set of 
ideas as the Developmental Hypothesis. 
 
The idea that REM-sleep and dreams have some relation to memory and learning is somewhat 
old but received renewed attention in the past decade. Winson (1990; 1993) called attention for 
the appearance of hippocampal theta rhythm in rodents during REM-sleep. Since theta waves 
are also present in the rodent exploratory behavior, he suggested that information gathered 
during spatial exploration is reprocessed during dreams. Louie & Wilson (2001), McNaughton 
(2000) and others also found evidence of replay, during sleep, of hippocampal ensembles that 
were active during diurnal exploratory behavior.    
 
McClelland (1998) also emphasized the role of hippocampal activation during REM-sleep. In 
his view, hippocampus serves as a buffer and at same time as a filter for recent learning 
experiences. New memories are transferred to the cortex during sleep, interleaved with old ones, 
in order to prevent the catastrophic interference that could occur if strong recent experiences are 
directly imprinted into cortical networks. This kind of idea is known as the Memory 
Consolidation Hypothesis (MCH) for dream function and has been largely promoted in the 
literature; see reviews (Stickgold et al. 2001; Maquet 2001). However, although MCH inspired 
innumerous studies, the evidence favoring it is weak and contradictory, as reviewed by Vertes 
and Eastman (2000) and Siegel (2001).   
 
A different idea, which we want to explore in this work, is the Unlearning Hypothesis (UH) of 
Crick and Mitchison (1983; 1986; 1995). In 1983, these researchers, at the same time that 
Hopfield and co-workers (1983), proposed that neural networks are inevitably plagued with 
parasitic attractors (states produced by mixture and interference between memories) and over-
stable (“obsessive”) attractors. A possible way for detecting and purging these modes, in a self-
organized way without appealing to some supervisor mechanism, is randomly exciting these 
networks, what could be done, say, by the PGO waves. The following relaxation process leads 
to the most common or the most stable attractors (because these two kinds of states have larger 
attractor basins). Then, they postulate that some kind of anti-Hebbian mechanism (“unlearning” 
or “reversed learning”) weakens or eliminates the parasitic states so detected.  
 
Notice that, in the Crick-Mitchison hypothesis, the unlearning idea is central because unlearning 
promotes a self-limiting (that is, negative feedback) process. This is not symmetrical to re-
learning, which produces a positive feedback: if a memory is strengthened, the probability of it 
being select anew from random stimulation grows, leading to the collapse of the system into a 
super attractor state. The Crick-Mitchison idea is intriguing because the postulated anti-Hebbian 
mechanism makes it very distinct from other hypothesis. The nature of such anti-Hebbian 
process, however, was controversial at the time of the proposal and has lead to some skepticism 
toward these ideas. We also notice that Crick and Mitchison emphasized (in our view, 
incorrectly, if we examine the computational model that inspired them) that most dreams are 
nonsensical garbage, underestimating the narrative coherence and continuity of dreams (for 
example, repetitive dreams), and also their strong emotional meaning. This occurred because 
they paid attention mostly to the elimination of spurious associations in the cortex instead of 
considering with care the effect of unlearning obsessive, over learned or over stable states in the 
limbic system.  
 
We could not finish this introductory review without commenting Freud's ideas. In a simplified 
form, Freud's hypothesis is that “Dreams are (disguised) realizations of (repressed) wishes 
whose function is to diminish the internal wishes pressure during sleep (Freud 1899). The 
disguised character may appear because some censorship mechanism tries to avoid that those 
wishes which are unacceptable to the individual emerge in the waking state. Freud recognizes, 
however, that afflictive dreams full of anxiety seem to be strong counter evidence to his 
hypothesis: they do not seem to be realizing some wish or desire. Then, Freud needs to appeal 
to ad hoc arguments in order to explain away the presence of fear and anxiety in dreams. For 
example, he conjectures that some of his patients have afflictive dreams (“counter-desire 
dreams”) because they have a masochist personality or are motivated by the occult “desire” to 
prove that Freud's theory is wrong! (Freud 1899). However, modern statistical studies of dream 
content have shown that anxiety indeed is the main affect present in dreams (McCarley 1998; 
Hobson et al. 2000; Stickgold et al. 2001). It is also very interesting to notice how much Freud's 
dreams related in (Freud 1899) are plenty of anxiety. Freud's “counter-desire” dreams, afflictive 
dreams, recurrent nightmares, anxiety dreams about future events etc. are a central concern in 
our theory because they are prominent dreaming experiences and challenge both Freud's ideas 
and the MCH. 
 
Neuroimaging data taken during REM-sleep shows that the amygdalar complex, the 
hippocampus and the basal ganglia are the most activated brain regions during REM sleep 
(Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997; Hobson et al. 2000). It is known that the amygdala has 
important relation to the formation and activation of emotional memories and anxiety/ruminant 
thoughts (Rogan et al. 1997; Armony et al. 1997; LeDoux 1998). On the other hand, 
hippocampal activation is commonly related to exploratory behavior and spatial memory (Louie 
& Wilson 2001; McNaughton 2000).  
 
Recently, the cannabinoid system has been implicated in short-term synaptic weakening 
(Wilson et al. 2001; Sullivan 2000), inhibition of electrical synapses (Boger et al. 1998), 
blocking of synapse stabilization (Kim & Thayer 2001), blocking of long term memory 
formation (Stella 1997) control of stress response (Martin et al. 2002), fear learning extinction 
(Marsicano et al. 2002) and other apparently unrelated functions (locomotor control, pain 
suppression, immunological responses). There is also evidence that connects endocannabinoids 
to sleep induction and REM-sleep control (Murillo-Rodriguez et al. 1998; Murillo-Rodriguez et 
al. 2001). These functions could be linked to the recovery from aversive outcomes in 
exploratory behavior. 
 
Our aim is to put all these new data in a framework inspired by Crick-Mitchison unlearning 
hypothesis and new itinerant memory models. Motivated by these new findings, we propose 
that:  
 
1. REM-sleep promotes weakening of over stable attractors in neural networks prone to 
excessive plasticity such as the amygdala, hippocampus, cerebellum, basal ganglia etc. It 
is a general homeostatic mechanism to prevent excessively recurrent neural states and 
actuates even in plastic neural tissues not related to conscious information processing 
(such as the habit forming locomotor system). This plasticity control is done by a 
synaptic weakening mechanism activated during REM-sleep and works even in the 
absence of phenomenal dreams. 
2. Dream narrative generation is a particular aspect of such plasticity control. Its 
evolutionary and developmental emergence is posterior to the development of the REM 
synaptic weakening mechanism. Dream generation may be implemented by simple 
activation and associative itinerancy in networks related to exploratory behavior.   
3. Dreams are simulations of exploratory behavior whose main function is to elicit 
emotional responses and promote their habituation. It is immaterial if the dream content 
refers to true memories or not. The important point is that the dream content is able to 
elicit emotional responses (fear, anxiety, obsessive wishes or thoughts etc.) in the 
amygdalar complex to be subjected to the habituation process. 
4. Synaptic weakening is done by strong activation of the endocannabinoid system during 
REM. Dream amnesia reflects this activation. 
5. Synaptic weakening made during REM-sleep constitutes an essential step in 
developmental synaptic pruning, not synaptic stabilization. 
 
We must recognize that our ideas are not incompatible with Freud's ones, since wishes are brain 
states potentially obsessive. The realization of a wish through a virtual simulation may, as 
proposed by Freud, may diminish its obsessive power (a habituation effect). Wishes also may 
elicit some anxiety: in several languages, to be anxious refers both to positive (to desire) and 
negative (to fear) affects. Endocannabinoids have ansiolitic properties and also can activate 
(indirectly) the reward system (Martin et al. 2002), inducing a simulated satisfaction. Also the 
idea of repression of dream content due to its anxiogenic potential is somewhat akin to the idea 
of unlearning: trying to make those states repellors instead of attractors.  
 
Our theory, however, intends to be more general: there are several scenarios, not related to inner 
desires or wishes but linked to mammalian exploratory behavior, that elicit anxiety and 
excessive brain plasticity. For example, exploration of (present) unknown environments, 
evocation of (past) traumatic memories or rumination about (future) possible aversive 
situations. In our theory, these scenarios would be fundamental dream themes. 
 
The presumed dream function is also more general: not simply to discharge stress by realizing, 
even in a disguised way, some wishes, but to habituate fear, anxiety and obsessive states (which 
sometimes accompany wishes but in general have other origins). In a nutshell, we propose that 
dream narrative function is akin to desensitization therapy (Marks & Tobena 1990), done in a 
simulated and virtual environment (the dream). Since dream narratives are simulations, they 
expose the subject to charged emotional experiences in a secure way. This has evolutionary 
advantages over real experience or even mammalian play behavior. This last point has also been 
emphasized by Revonsuo evolutionary dream theory (Revonsuo 2000), although we stress here 
emotional (un)learning (extinction of emotional responses) instead of cognitive learning of 
skills in virtual environments. 
 
The paper is organized as follow. In Sec. II we present our reformulation of the Crick-Mitchison 
unlearning hypothesis. The hypothesis is connected to recent experimental findings, put in a 
broader context and compared to alternative dream theories. In Sec. III, we introduce a simple 
computational model of self-organized unlearning which includes dream narrative as an 
itinerant associative dynamics. In Sec. IV we discuss the results obtained with the 
computational model. As a spin-off, we get an intriguing suggestion about replay and 
acceleration in dream phenomenology. In Sec. V we discuss a possible biomolecular foundation 
for the unlearning process: a strong activation of the cannabinoid system during REM-sleep. In 
Sec. VI, we present some predictions derived from the Unlearning Hypothesis and suggest new 
experimental tests. The last section contains a summary of our findings. 
 
II. Reformulating the Crick-Mitchison hypothesis 
 
Since its original formulation, there occurred at least three developments relevant to Crick-
Mitchison's unlearning hypothesis: 1) the application of brain imaging techniques to the study 
of REM-sleep (Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997); 2) advances in the understanding of the 
neurobiology of extinction, habituation, synaptic weakening and other unlearning-like 
phenomena (Marsicano et al. 2002); 3) a deeper analysis of unlearning algorithms in attractor 
neural networks (vanHemmen 1997). These algorithms were the basis for the ideas developed 
by Crick and Mitchison. 
 
We claim that these developments solve several weak points of the original Crick-Mitchison 
hypothesis. These deficiencies are related to: a) what is unlearned; b) why it is unlearned; c) 
how it is unlearned.  This is fully elaborated in the next subsections. Comparison with the 
memory consolidation hypothesis (MCH), the main rival of the unlearning hypothesis (UH), is 
made in parallel. 
 
A. What is unlearned? 
 
In the initial formulation of unlearning algorithms, the basic model was an attractor network 
with a simple auto-associative synaptic matrix, the Hopfield model (Hopfield et al. 1983) This 
network can store up to 0.14 N patterns (representing memories or other meaningful brain 
states), where N is the number of neurons. Above this threshold, there occurs a load catastrophe: 
the memorized patterns turn out unstable and a myriad of mixed (combination of three or more 
patterns) and spurious states (“spin glass” states that have no correlation with the learned 
patterns) appear (Krogh et al. 1991). 
 
Hopfield and co-workers noticed that if we randomly excite the network and let it relax, 
mixtures and spurious states are preferably found. Then, if we add to the synaptic matrix an 
anti-Hebbian term, after several cycles of this unlearning procedure, we recover positive 
stability for the desired patterns, even well above the 0.14 N load. 
 
When Crick and Mitchison published their dream hypothesis (with Hopfield and co-workers 
publishing the unlearning algorithm in the same Nature issue), they naturally identified the 
dream content to the mixture and spurious states. This means that dreams were initially thought 
as a succession of uncorrelated and meaningless states. This initial formulation emphasized the 
bizarreness of dream content, the condensation (mixture states) phenomenon and downgraded 
the apparent coherence of dream narratives. A common formulation at that time was “dreams 
are garbage which contains no information and need to be eliminated instead of remembered”, 
leading to understandable resistance by dream researchers and psychotherapists. 
 
Later, it has been recognized that mixture and spurious states are not of primary importance in 
attractor networks, since, by using incremental learning algorithms instead of the simple 
correlational matrix of the Hopfield model, one can store up to the theoretical limit of 2N 
patterns without the load catastrophe (Krogh et al. 1991; Bouten et al. 1995). However, studies 
about the unlearning algorithm continued, mainly due to the interesting self-organized character 
of the unlearning procedure and its biological flavor (vanHemmen 1997).  
 
We think, however, that from a biological point of view, the problematic states in attractor 
networks are not spurious or mixture states but patterns over imprinted due to strong synaptic 
modification. This problem has been addressed by some authors, even in the first papers about 
unlearning algorithms (Clark et al. 1984). These over learned states are, in a sense, obsessive: 
the recovery flux is monopolized by them and other normal patterns have their stability and 
attraction basins diminished.  
 
In biological networks, the origin of these over learned states is varied: fear learning produces 
strong conditioned associations and emotional responses; traumatic events may lead to strong 
emotional episodic memories common in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); ruminative 
(recurrent) thoughts are common in depression and anxiety disorders; sexual rumination 
certainly may turn out obsessive. Highly pleasurable experiences could also induce strong 
conditioned responses and addicting behavior. Obsessive-compulsive disorder involves 
recurrent activity in motor systems. Strong learning protocols (such as intensive training in 
spatio-visual games like chess, Tetris and videogames) induce spontaneous recurrent 
hypnagogic imagery (Stickgold et al. 2000). Repetitive motor activation also may induce 
excessive imprinting in motor areas. On the overall, brain plasticity seems to lead easily to 
obsessive dynamics, from the common experience of catchy jingles and intruding music to 
stereotyped motor activation (tremor, tics, Tourete syndrome etc.) and obsessive-compulsive 
thought and behavior. And, as it is well known, the most plastic brain tissues are the amygdala, 
the hippocampus and the cerebellum. It seems that a prime problem for these regions is not how 
to learn but how to not over learn. 
 
But if REM-sleep/dreams refer to an unlearning procedure that basically try to manage over 
imprinted patterns then dreams mainly shall be composed by meaningful, emotional content. 
For example, if dreams correspond to the brain tentative of extinction of fear learning, then the 
usual presence of anxiety and threatening scenarios in dreams and the repetitive nature of 
nightmares (Hartman 1998) make sense. Dream content will not be formed by spurious or 
mixture states, but will be related to obsessive or potentially obsessive states which need to be 
detected and weakened. Dreams will be “royal roads” to emotionally charged memories, fears 
and obsessions stored in the amygdala. What must be unlearned is not the dream content, 
but the excessive emotional response to the dream content. 
 
B. Why is it unlearned? 
 
We have argued that an important problem in attractor networks is that over imprinted states 
(which we call “strong patterns” from now) have very large and deep attractor basins. They not 
only monopolize the recovery dynamics (a large set of initial conditions activates the strong 
patterns) but, indirectly, the stability of other patterns is reduced. We think that theses states are 
the primary targets for unlearning during REM-sleep. In Crick and Mitchison's words: “We 
dream to forget”. Our hypothesis is slightly more specific: “We dream to weaken over stable 
neural states”. We dream as a part of an endogenous homeostatic mechanism that prevents 
excessive plasticity and obsession.  
 
We remark that, in our view, unlearning is needed not only for fear conditioned responses but 
also for over imprinted episodic memories, over trained procedural behavior,  pleasurable 
behavior, sexual ruminations etc, in the measure that they also might turn out obsessive: lovers 
dream with each other in order to habituate love obsession! However, since fear learning is the 
most studied model for the formation of strong memories/associations, and recent findings 
about the role of endocannabinoids in fear learning extinction (Marsicano et al. 2002) enable us 
to make experimental predictions, we concentrate from now in dreams involving fear and 
anxiety (which indeed are the main affects present in dreams (McCarley 1998)). 
 
But is REM-sleep only part of a homeostatic mechanism for the control of excessive plasticity? 
We believe that this is the primary function of REM-sleep (which is present even in low 
mammals, fetuses and newborns where dream narrative is absent). But biological features 
frequently are selected because they implement (or contribute to) several functions, not all 
operating at the same time: for example, play behavior presumably has been selected in 
mammals because it contributes both for cognitive learning (how to map and control the 
environment), social learning (how to interact with others) and emotional learning (how to 
control emotional responses). The function of play may also be different for small children, 
mature children and adults. We believe in a similar role for dream narrative: like play behavior, 
dreaming at more mature stages provides a secure mechanism for emotional (un)learning, that 
is, habituation and extinction of excessive emotional response to aversive situations. REM-sleep 
supports this function by furnishing the basic unlearning mechanism. 
 
We notice that fear and anxiety are main affects during exploratory behavior. So, we conceive 
dreams not only as having a defensive, self-repairing role, preventing obsession from excessive 
plasticity (say, traumatic memories). Dream narrative seems to be an exploratory behavior made 
off-line during sleep, where the organism not only explores virtual environments constructed 
from the past but also from its present and future concerns (anxiety thoughts and fears). Anxiety 
dreams are mainly simulations of threatening scenarios, already encountered in waking life or 
not. For an elaborated defense of this hypothesis, see Revonsuo (2000). 
 
This means that, like juvenile play and other simulated behavior, dreams are future-oriented or 
prospective: habituation of excessive emotional response to aversive stimuli prepares the 
organism to future encounters with more aversive situations. This contrasts to the past-oriented 
character assumed by the memory consolidation hypothesis but accords with the frequent case 
of dreaming about future-related events. Dreams do not consolidate the past but explore the 
future by simulating aversive scenarios: a concrete realization of Nietzsche quoted idea about 
dream function. 
 
 
C. How is it unlearned? 
 
For unlearning strong patterns we must detect them and change the part of the synaptic matrix 
responsible for their stability. These strong patterns must be activated before weakening them if 
we desire selective unlearning instead of simple passive decay. But their replay should not 
collaborate to their memory consolidation. These contradictory requirements may be the reason 
for dreams to occur under inhibition of mechanisms for long term memory formation and 
attention processes. 
 
We think that the detection of strong patterns is done automatically under the dream associative 
process. In the computational model below, we assume that dreaming is an uncontrolled 
Jamesian stream of thought (James 1892), a staccato flow of memories, thoughts and mental 
images in Walter Freeman dynamical description (Freeman 2000). This flow is not purely 
random but constitutes a narrative (or several narratives) full of associative transitions and 
emotional content. This is realized in our model by a continuous but chaotic exploration of 
network states made autonomously due to short-term activation-dependent synaptic weakening. 
 
This continuous wandering is affected by the relative stability of the embedded patterns. Over 
imprinted patterns finally dominate the dynamics, that is, initial random activation of the 
network leads, after a transient, to preferential wandering over these states (memories or 
associations). We think that this chaotic itinerant dynamics gives a basis for modeling the 
dreaming state as a (noisy) associative narrative that walks toward an emotional climax. 
 The strong patterns are then weakened by the unlearning process. This unlearning is not a 
passive synaptic decay, but is an active process, selective and associative, in the sense that only 
states visited during the dream induce anti-Hebbian synaptic weakening. The strong patterns 
must be replayed, elicited anew for anti-Hebbian processes to work. This view is compatible 
with the recent findings about the importance of replaying the aversive cues for 
endocannabinoid production and concomitant extinction of fear learning (Marsicano et al. 
2002). The possible relationship between anti-Hebbian unlearning and endocannabinoids will 
be fully elaborated in Sec. V. 
 
We make a remark about an experimental cornerstone of the Memory Consolidation 
Hypothesis: the replay of hippocampal place cells in rats (Louie & Wilson 2001; McNaughton 
2000). Under the Unlearning Hypothesis, this replay does not mean memory replay for 
consolidation, but corresponds to the elicitation of environmental cues related to a simulated 
aversive situation. In our view, this replay of place cells only sets the scenario, like a human 
dreaming of being persecuted by a strange inside his familiar house.  
 
D. Comparison with the developmental hypothesis 
 
In the fetus and newborn, the memory systems and synapses are very plastic. As already 
observed by Crick and Mitchison, probably most of the initial network activation induces 
accidentally over imprinted states and spurious associations which should be unlearned. We 
suggest here a stronger connection between REM-sleep and development: unlearning may be a 
necessary step toward the developmental massive synaptic pruning that sculpts the mature brain 
(Rakic et al. 1994; Innocenti 1995; Barbato & Kinouchi 2000). 
 
So, according to our view, REM-sleep in fetuses and immature children detects over imprinted 
states for weakening them. It performs the primary role (control of over stable patterns) but not 
the secondary role (emotional (un)learning, made by dream narrative which probably is absent 
in small children). Contrasting to the developmental hypothesis, we propose that extensive 
REM-sleep does not promote synaptic stabilization or imprinting of genetic memories, but 
synaptic weakening, which is known to be a necessary step for synaptic pruning and axon 
withdraw. This could be tested by searching for temporal correlation between synaptic and 
REM-sleep density curves. Anew, we have synaptic anti-Hebbian weakening before pruning, 
not memory consolidation. 
  
D. Comparison with the Memory Consolidation Hypothesis 
 
Spatial exploratory behavior correlates well with quantitative analysis of dream content 
(Revonsuo 2000). Anxiety and fear is a principal component in exploratory behavior, both in a 
past and in a future sense: bad outcomes of past exploratory behavior and the expectation of bad 
outcomes in new environments are the stuff of fear and anxiety. The statistics of dream content 
shows a high proportion of “walking dreams” in new, possibly threatening environments. There 
is also a higher proportion of prey behavior (“chase dreams”) that elicit the classic freezing, 
running and aggressive defense behaviors. These themes are not simple memories to be 
consolidated or Freudian (masochistic) desires, but threatening scenarios that make sense from 
an evolutionary point of view (Revonsuo 2000).   
 
Revonsuo “virtual exploratory behavior” hypothesis explains why the specific areas listed by 
Hobson and McCarley (Hobson & McCarley 1977; McCarley 1998; Hobson et al. 2000; 
Stickgold et al. 2001) are the most activated during REM-sleep: brain areas related to walking 
function (motor cortex, basal ganglia, cerebellum, vestibular area (Braun et al. 1997)), visual 
areas in primates (but with inactivation of primary V1 area and frontal areas, forming a 
visual/limbic closed system (Braun et al. 1998)), olfactory bulb in other mammals (Louie & 
Wilson 2001). Basically, they are related to exploratory behavior and are co-activated with 
emotional response in amygdala and spatial memory in hippocampus (Maquet et al. 1996; 
Braun et al., 1997). We also remember that, in the waking animal, theta waves are related to 
exploratory behavior and PGO waves are elicited in startling responses. 
 
Contrasting to MCH, we conceive the dream as not being a simple rehearsal of previous 
experience. The simulated exploratory behavior is “new” in the sense that the threatening 
scenarios and the corresponding emotional responses, although stereotyped, are not simple 
replays. They are better conceived as emerging from the primary excitation of the amygdala: 
this excitation leads to an associative walk between the amygdalar strong attractors.  
 
We think that subjects with PTSD have vivid dreams with the original trauma trying to 
habituate their emotional response (Rothbaum & Mellman 2001). The relative failure of this 
homeostatic mechanism may be related to a low production of cannabinoid receptors 
(Marsicano et al. 2002). After all, traumatic memories need not to be consolidated, but 
weakened. We also observe that dreams of subjects with PTSD not only replay the primary 
experience but frequently refer to threats in the present, contain distorted features and drift away 
from the original theme as recovery progress (Esposito et al. 1999; Hartmann 1998). This 
temporal evolution is fully compatible with the emotional response Unlearning Hypothesis. It is 
also curious that virtual reality simulations are being used for treatment of PTSD (Rothbaum et 
al. 2001) and that a treatment that mimic REM-sleep (EMDR – Eye Movement Desensitization 
and Reprocessing) is perhaps the most efficient psychotherapy to PTSD (Stickgold 2002). 
 
We emphasize that dreaming with future oriented events also stays in clear contradiction to the 
Memory Consolidation Hypothesis. As further examples of future oriented dreaming that 
explores new situations, we may cite some common dream themes: examination dreams and 
marriage dreams. These dreams mainly occur before the event date (for example, to dream with 
a PhD thesis examination before its occurrence) and usually are full of anxiety (usually the 
dream involves vexing outcomes). Another future oriented theme is a pregnant woman 
dreaming with an ill-formed baby or a mother dreaming with her children being in danger: no 
true memories (nor masochist desires) to be consolidated here.  
 
 
III. Computational Model 
 
Crick and Mitchison developed their ideas from suggestions given by a simple computational 
model (Hopfield network). Let us concretize our ideas by using an improved neural network 
model. We prefer to call these models as “qualitative computational models”, in a sense similar 
to “qualitative analysis of differential equations”. We want to examine generic and robust 
dynamical behaviors, not quantitative details. 
 
For those not familiar with models as used in theoretical science, we clarify the methodological 
function of (qualitative) computational models. They do not intend to prove (or disprove) a 
hypothesis, to substitute experiments, or even to simulate biophysical mechanisms (as done in 
computational neuroscience). Qualitative models intend to realize a verbal model in a more 
concrete way, to demonstrate that the verbal model “works”, showing that its assumptions are 
indeed sufficient for producing the desired behavior.  
 
Implementing a computational model often aid to make explicit some tacit assumptions 
incrusted in verbal models. It also adds plausibility to the original idea because it may show that 
the behavior of interest is robust if model parameters are changed. Another fruitful outcome is 
the appearance of unexpected phenomena: behaviors not expected (or even counter-intuitive) 
given the verbal model may turn out prominent in the computational model. These unexpected 
behaviors are frequently produced by feedback effects. As is well known, verbal models usually 
have difficulty to describe circular causality so common in dynamical systems.  
 
A. Itinerant associative dynamics: implementing William James's “Stream of Thought” 
 
One of the cornerstones in the resurgence of neural networks models in the 80's is the content 
addressable memory (CAM) model of Hopfield (1982; 1983; 1984). This model popularized a 
paradigm where memories and meaningful brain states are represented as state vectors that are 
(fixed point) attractors: the relevant states are stationary spatial patterns of neural firing in the 
network. Later, extensions of this kind of attractor network have been proposed that implement 
transitions between patterns, the so called itinerant memory models (Horn & Usher 1991; 
Adachi & Aihara 1997; Adachi & Aihara 1999). In itinerant models, there are no more true 
fixed point attractors: a slow dynamics, usually implemented as neuronal fatigue (or, as in our 
model, as synaptic regulation), induces transitions between the former attractors.       
 
From a historical perspective, this kind of itinerant dynamics indeed may be viewed as a 
computational realization of original ideas from William James more than a century ago. A 
strong emphasis in James writings is his recurrent comparison between the complexity of the 
thought flux and the analogous complexity of a turbulent fluid. The following examples are 
typical of James writings (James 1884; 1892): 
 
What must be admitted is that the definite images of traditional psychology form but the very 
smallest part of our minds as they actually live. The traditional psychology talks like one who 
should say a river consists of noting but pailful, spoonful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other 
molded forms of water. Even were the pail and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still 
between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness 
that psychologists resolutely overlook.  Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in 
the free water that flows round it.  
 
James analogy of the “stream of thought” as a complex fluid is not an old fashioned idea but a 
very fortunate one, from a physicist point of view. Indeed, although the local laws for fluid 
movement are well known, their strong non-linearity precludes a global understanding of the 
complex behavior of fluids. Pattern formation such as stable vortices and other structures are ill 
understood, and the origin of complex patterns and turbulence in fluids is one of the greatest 
challenges to present day physics.       By exposing his analogy of mental processes with 
complex physical systems, James wants to recover the richness of the thought process from 
rationalist models based on a manipulation of atomic, isolated, timeless symbols, a perspective 
dominant in XIX century which yet today informs a large part of cognitive science: 
 
The demand for atoms of feeling, which shall be real units, seems a sheer vagary, an 
illegitimate metaphor. (…) There is no reason to suppose that the same feeling ever does or can 
recur again. The same thing may recur and be known in an indefinite number of successive 
feelings; but does the least proof exist that in any two of them it is represented in an identical 
subjective state? All analogy points to the other way. For when the identical thing recurs, it is 
always thought of in a fresh manner, seen under a somewhat different angle, apprehended in 
different relations from those in which it last appeared. (…) However it may be of the stream of 
real life, of the mental river the saying of Herakleitos is probably literally true: we never bathe 
twice in the same water there. How could we, when the structure of our brain itself is 
continually growing different under the pressure of experience? For an identical feeling to 
recur, it would have to recur in an unmodified brain, which is an impossibility. The organ, after 
intervening states, cannot react as it did before they came. 
 
In other words, for James, memories, feelings and thoughts are complex spatio-temporal 
patterns which cannot be isolated from an underlying neural activity as vortices cannot be 
isolated from the river stream which gives origin to them. His emphasis on this distributed and 
extended nature of mental states (a high dimensional activation pattern), on the bounded but 
non-recurring activity (a chaotic attractor behavior) and long-range temporal correlations typical 
of complex systems is surprisingly contemporaneous. James contrasts psychologies based in 
grammatical-like symbol manipulation with ideas inspired by the complex behavior of extended 
dynamical systems, favoring the last description. It seems that the cognitivist versus dynamicist 
controversy (van Gelder 1998; Sternad 2000; Kinouchi 2001) has his roots at least in William 
James times. 
 
Of particular interest to our modeling effort is James description of the thought flux as being at 
the same time continuous but not homogeneous, a sequence of transitions between metastable 
states:   
 
When we take a rapid general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes 
us first it the different pace of its different portions. Our mental life, like a bird's life, seems to 
be made of an alternation of flights and perchings (...). The resting places are usually occupied 
by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the 
mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the places of flight are filled 
with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters 
contemplated in the periods of comparative rest. 
 
Let us call the resting-places the “substantive parts” and the places of flight the “transitive 
part”, of the stream of thought. We may then say that the main end of our thinking is at all times 
the attainment of some other “substantive” part than the one from which we have just been 
dislodged. And we may say that the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from one 
substantive conclusion to another. 
 
In our model, the substantive states are the embedded patterns usual in attractor networks. The 
transition between substantive states will be induced by a short-term anti-Hebbian term 
although other neuronal fatigue mechanisms could be used. 
 
Another important point emphasized by James is the fuzzy and mixed character of each actual 
mental representation, which shall be realized in our model by the fact that the neural network 
state at a given time t may have simultaneous correlation to several embedded memory vectors: 
 If the image comes unfringed it reveals but a simple quality, thing or event; if it come fringed it 
reveals something expressly taken universally or in a scheme of relations. The difference 
between thought and feeling thus reduces itself, in the last subjective analysis, to the presence 
or absence of “fringe”. And this in turn reduces itself, with much probability, in the last 
physiological analysis, to the absence or presence of sub-excitements of an effective degree of 
strength in other convolutions of the brain than those whose discharges underlie the more 
definite nucleus, the substantive ingredient, of the thought  in this instance, the word or 
image it may happen to arouse. (...) It is in short the re-instatement of the vague to its proper 
place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the reader's attention. 
 
James also tries to link his ideas to the physical models of brain activity of his time: 
 
The best symbol for it seems to be an electric conductor, the amount of whose charge at one 
point is a function of the total charge elsewhere. Some tracts are always waning in tension, 
some waxing, whilst other actively discharge. The states of tension, however, have a positive 
influence as the discharges in determining the total condition (...). But as the distribution of 
brain-tension shifts from one relative state of equilibrium to another, like the aurora borealis or 
the gyrations of a kaleidoscope, now rapid and now slow, it is likely that the brain faithful 
psychic concomitant is heavier-footed than itself, that its rate of change is coarser-grained, that 
it cannot match each one of the organ's irradiations by a shifting inward iridescence of its own? 
But if it can do this, its inward iridescences must be infinite, for the brain-redistributions are in 
infinite variety. If so coarse a thing as a telephone-plate can be made to trill for years and never 
reduplicate its inward condition, how much more this be the case with the infinitely delicate 
brain? 
 
Modern advocates of chaotic itinerancy in memory models seem not to be aware of the 
honorable philosophical and psychological tradition behind their ideas. Since it has been the 
reading of James that has inspired this work, we would like to amend this somewhat priority 
injustice by calling our particular itinerant memory model as the “James Machine”. 
 
B. The computational model 
 
The itinerant flux is implemented in the following associative memory network. A set of N units 
(each unit may represent a neural population instead of a single neuron) are fully connected. 
Each unit is modeled by a continuous state variable (average firing rate or “activation level”) Si 
(i=1,…,N) which are updated in parallel at discrete time steps as: 
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The transfer function G(x) could be any sigmoid function of the total input x with image in [-
1,1] (negative values mean activity bellow some spontaneous average level); θ is a bias term 
related to the cell excitability threshold. For computational convenience (absence of calculation 
of exponentials) we perform our simulations with the function: 
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 The initial synaptic matrix Jij(0) has the form of a weighted correlation matrix (Clark et al. 
1984; Sejnowsky et al. 1989)  storing P vector patterns ξµ  = ξiµ , (i=1,…,N; µ=1,…, P) : 
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The patterns ξµ can be interpreted as memories, but more generally they represent metastable 
network states (James's substantive states). For simplicity, we choose ξiµ ∈ {1,-1} randomly. In 
the following we use boldface symbols for vectors and normal symbols for components. 
 
If a direct application to fear learning is desired, we can interpret the pattern {ξi} (i=1,…, N) as 
composed by two sub patterns: ξi(S) (i=1,…,NS) is the internal representation of the aversive 
stimulus and ξi(R) (i=NS+1,…,N) is the corresponding emotional response. Since the network is a 
content addressable memory, partial activation of the fear cues ξ(S) will elicit the activation of 
the emotional response ξ(R). Notice that we are working in the memory regime (P < 0.14 N), 
bellow the load catastrophe. 
 
The weight Fµ controls the relative stability of pattern ξµ. In a biological context, they are 
induced by factors like attention, surprise, stimulus salience, importance due to aversive 
context, intensive repetition etc. The initial symmetry condition Jij = Jji is used here for 
simplicity, but is not important for itinerant memory models and may be relaxed. 
 
The network state S(t) = {S1(t),…,SN(t)} changes following Eq. (1) in a very fast time scale 
(milliseconds). As is well known (Hopfield 1982; 1984), a random initial state S(0) relaxes 
toward some embedded pattern ξµ. So, in this scenario of strong patterns bellow saturation, it is 
natural that random initial activation leads to the elicitation of non-random and meaningful 
states.  
 
The distinctive ingredient of our model is that the synapses Jij(t) are not static but evolve, both 
in a fast as a slow time scale dynamics, involving anti-Hebbian terms (the biological rationale 
for anti-Hebbian processes will be discussed latter). The fast time scale dynamics (synaptic 
regulation) is written as: 
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where ηf  is a small step parameter. The fast dynamics transform the state being visited (usually 
some embedded pattern ξµ into a repellor: the pattern is destabilized. However, this change is 
not permanent but reversible: the repulsive anti-Hebbian term associated to the visited states is 
erased by the (1-1/τ) factor, that is, τ is a recovery time of the synaptic regulation process.  
 
Without this destabilization dynamics, the system is simply a Hopfield model with graded 
response units (Hopfield 1984). In that case, if we start from some initial state, the system 
relaxes fast to some of the stored patterns and remains there. This means that the patterns  ξµ are 
stable fixed-point attractors. The synaptic regulation dynamics, however, makes the embedded 
patterns metastable, that is, the system finally escapes from the present pattern to another one 
and so on, performing an “itinerant flux”. The rapid transient states (which sometimes are 
combinations of several patterns) between the substantive states correspond to James's transitive 
states.   
 
In the slow time scale, connections evolve as: 
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Since this process has no recovery time, we have a permanent anti-Hebbian unlearning. The 
destabilization process must be faster than the unlearning process, because we want that 
transitions occur before unlearning turns the pattern a permanent repellor. To control plasticity 
(without forgetting the important attractors) we need pattern weakening, not pattern erasing. 
This is implemented by setting ηs<< ηf . 
 
The fast synaptic component can be initialized from zero (Jijf(0)=0) and the slow component 
may start from the initial state given by Eq. (3). Finally, at any time, the total synaptic efficacy 
is: 
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Notice that the particular choice of network model (sigmoid units, full connectivity, initial 
connection matrix, discrete time, parallel update etc.) and even the specific destabilization 
mechanism are immaterial. The important point is the implementation of transitions between 
patterns (itinerant dynamics) and long term weakening of visited patterns (to make permanent 
changes in the synaptic matrix). In more abstract terms, we need a dynamics where patterns are 
saddle points or, as in our model, fixed points that turn out (reversibly) unstable after being 
visited, and whose permanent stability is weakened slowly. This could be implemented in other 
model architectures, for example, in the Hopfield-like model of Sommer and Wennekers (2001) 
where the basic elements are two-compartmental (Pinsky-Rinzel) biophysical neurons. 
 
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
 
A. Effect of fast synaptic regulation: James itinerant flux 
 
The overall dynamics of the model is the following. With the fast synaptic regulation given by 
Eq. (4) but without the long-term unlearning process of Eq. (5), the system performs a chaotic 
itinerant flux between the substantive states ξµ. Chaotic is used here in the technical sense: not 
random or disorganized flux, but simply a non-periodic but bounded flux whose long term 
outcome is sensible to small perturbations. 
 
The weights Fµ are not permanently modified by the itinerant flux. If there are strong 
(obsessive) patterns, these attractors dominate the dynamics, creating cycles between them 
(“meta-basins”) and preventing the access to the normal states. For example, we show in Fig.1 
the case where three strong patterns (A,B,C) with F=3 dominate over three normal ones with 
F=1. This is detected by following the evolution of the overlaps: 
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that measure the correlation between the network state and the µ-th embedded state. 
 
We notice that pattern destabilization favors associative itinerancy, that is, transitions between 
correlated patterns (i. e., that have mutual overlap Mµν = 1/N ∑j=1 ξjµ  ξjν of order O(1). We 
identify this chaotic free associative trajectory with the dream narrative. In our example in 
Fig.1, patterns B and C have mutual overlap of 0.1. 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Time evolution of the overlaps mµ(t) between the network state and the stored 
patterns during the itinerant dynamics. Parameters: N = 100, θ = 0, ηf = 0.02, τf = 100, ηs = 
0.001, three strong patterns {A, B, C} with F=3 and three normal patterns {D, E, F} with F=1. 
Notice that we have constructed patterns B and C with a mutual overlap MBC = 0.1 and, due to 
this correlation, the activation of one of them leads to the evocation of the other and vice-versa. 
The permanent unlearning process starts at t = 1000. With progressive unlearning, the transition 
rate accelerates (notice the different time scales in the panels). Eventually the system escapes 
from the obsessive meta-basin {A, B, C} and the normal patterns {D, E, F} turn out accessible 
for the itinerant dynamics. The overall dynamics is chaotic, not cyclic, as can be hinted by the 
variable order of pattern excitation. 
 
 
 
B. Comparison with adaptive threshold models 
 
Horn and Usher (1991) and Adachi and Aihara (Adachi & Aihara 1997; 1999) developed 
models of itinerant dynamics where the transitions between patterns is due to the excitability 
bias term θ(t).  In these models, if the cell is active above a basal level, the bias θ(t) grows so 
that the cell accommodates to the input and if the neuron is quiescent, the bias decays as: 
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where
 
SR  is the basal level (say, SR = 0.5).  
 
We have performed simulations with this mechanism (not show). In contrast to our synaptic 
anti-Hebbian regulation term, the excitability bias mechanism induces not only the desired 
transitions between different patterns but also a fast oscillation between patterns and anti-
patterns. This may be observed also in the Adachi-Aihara simulations (Adachi & Aihara 1999). 
Since the interesting transitions are between different patterns, the trivial pattern-antipattern 
oscillation is undesirable and biologically unrealistic. Our dynamics with synaptic regulation 
does not produce this pattern-antipattern oscillation because both states turn out repellors under 
the synaptic anti-Hebbian term. 
 
C. Effect of unlearning: control of the stabilities of attractors  
 
When the slow unlearning dynamics is active, the connection matrix Jijs slowly changes, making 
the visited patterns permanently less stable. Since the intensity of weakening is proportional to 
the time spent in the visited state (which, by its turn, is correlated to the state stability), the 
patterns with the largest or deep basins are more weakened.     
 
In Fig.1, we show a single dream trajectory (itinerancy plus unlearning) on the previous 
pathological case of three obsessive states that form a dominant cycle A-B-C. Unlearning starts 
at step t=1000. In Fig.2 we show the effect of unlearning on the permanent synaptic matrix. As 
a measure of the pattern strength we use the so called “average stability”:  
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where the λi’s are the local (cell) stabilities. Notice that we measure the time evolution of the 
patterns stabilities in terms of the slow Jijs(t) matrix. Changes in the fast synaptic component Jijf 
are reversible and do not contribute to permanent unlearning. 
 
Along the time, we see that not only the stability of the obsessive states is diminished but also 
the stability of the normal states is enhanced (Fig.2). This is an indirect effect due to the fact 
that all embedded patterns share the same synaptic matrix. As another index of the equilibrium 
between patterns, we measure the overlap  
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between the long term synaptic matrix Jijs(t) and the simple Hebb matrix JijH = 1/PN ∑µP ξiµ ξjµ   
where all patterns have weight Fµ =1. The overlap OH(t) achieves a maximum at the time where 
the stability of normal patterns is most enhanced (Fig.2, inset).   
 
We also studied the effect of the standard unlearning algorithm: we simply excite the network, 
perform an unlearning step when the network achieves a fixed point, and repeat the process 
(Hopfield et al. 1983; vanHemmen 1997). We have found that the itinerant chaotic process 
leads to more efficient stability equilibration between patterns than this standard algorithm (to 
be fully reported elsewhere). Exhaustive simulations with an extensive number of embedded 
patterns should be performed to fully characterize the effect of parameters ηf, ηs, τf, the 
strengths Fµ, the fraction of strong patterns etc. (to be reported elsewhere). Notice that a larger 
number of patterns could be used (proportional to the number N of neurons) so that the 
itinerancy dynamics could be very rich. Here we used a small (six) number of patterns because 
we focused only on qualitative and robust behaviors that are sufficient to illustrate our 
reformulation of Crick-Mitchison hypothesis. 
 
  
Figure 2: Time evolution of the stabilities Λµ of the stored patterns during the unlearning 
process. Notice that the stability of the normal patterns is enhanced when the networks unlearns 
the strong patterns, achieving a maximum at moderate dream time. Inset: time evolution of the 
normalized overlap OH (t) between the slow coupling matrix Jijs and the unbiased (Fµ =1) Hebb 
matrix. 
 
 
VI. A biological candidate for the unlearning mechanism 
 
The weakest point of the unlearning proposal (or perhaps, its strongest prediction) is that if 
patterns are imprinted in the synaptic matrix by a correlational Hebbian mechanism (Sejnowsky 
et al. 1989), then an exact (unlearning, reverse learning) anti-Hebbian mechanism is necessary 
for pattern destabilization (vanHemmen 1997). Up to now, anti-Hebbian mechanisms are not 
accepted to exist in the brain. However, this is not especially grave since, due to the empiricist 
pace of neurosciences, even Hebbian mechanisms are not universally accepted as the basis of 
learning. So, what we need to determine by now is if such anti-Hebbian mechanism gained 
plausibility after twenty years from its original formulation. We believe that the answer is 
positive, and propose that the neurobiological basis for anti-Hebbian unlearning is the 
cannabinoid system.  
 
Contrasting with classical neurotransmission, the cannabinoid system uses retrograde signals. In 
the central nervous system, it is based on the CB1 receptor (mainly situated at pre-synaptic 
terminals) and endocannabinoids as N-arachidonoylethanolamine (Anandamide) and 2-
arachidonoyl-glycerol (2-AG) that are produced at the post-synaptic terminal (Stella 1997). The 
main known memory effects of the cannabinoid system are: 
a) Short-time weakening of synapses known as Depolarization-induced Suppression of 
Excitation (DSE) or Inhibition (DSI) (Wilson et al. 2001; Sullivan 2000). In these 
phenomena, the pre-synaptic fusion of vesicles, which may contain excitatory (AMPA) 
or inhibitory (GABA) neurotransmitters, is suppressed due to the activation of CB1 
receptors in a time scale of tens of milliseconds to seconds. This means that if the post-
synaptic neuron is highly firing, it regulates (weakens) its inputs by retro-signaling to the 
CB1 receptors through endocannabinoids, which are produced on demand due to 
depolarization of the post-synaptic cell. 
b) Blockade of long term potentiation (LTP) or depression (LTD) (Misner & Sullivan 
1999; Sullivan, 2000; Stella 1997). This is done both by indirect and direct pathways. It 
is also been found that mutant mice without CB1 receptors have enhanced spatial 
memory and LTP in the hippocampus (Bohme et al. 2000), but show persistence 
phenomena (impaired capacity of unlearn maladaptive behaviors) and increased level of 
anxiety (Varvel & Lichtman 2000). 
c) Cannabinoids are critical ingredients in the extinction of fear learning (Marsicano et al. 
2002). Knock-out rats without cannabinoid receptors show increased memory but 
persistent behavior, slow fear learning extinction rate and high levels of anxiety-like 
behavior. 
d) Cannabinoids inhibit the formation of new synapses (Kim & Thayer 2001). 
e) Endocannabinoids also shut down electrical synapses (Murillo-Rodriguez et al. 2001b). 
f) Cannabinoids enhance REM-sleep density and impairs memory in rats (Murillo-
Rodriguez et al. 1998; 2001).  
g) A lipid (Oleamide) that is a strong inductor of sleep and accumulates in sleep-deprived 
rats also inhibit the hydrolysis of endocannabinoids, promoting higher endocannabinoid 
efficiency (Murillo-Rodriguez et al. 2001b).  
 
Taken together, these facts put the cannabinoid system as a prime candidate to mediate 
unlearning during REM-sleep. Endocannabinoids are not stored in vesicles, but are produced on 
demand by strongly firing of post-synaptic neurons (Stella 1997). We conjecture that, since 
REM-sleep strongly activates plastic tissues, REM-sleep promotes strong production and 
liberation of endocannabinoids. The cannabinoid efficiency is further increased by the presence 
of the sleep-inducing lipid Oleamide. Tissues most activated during REM-sleep also show a 
high density of cannabinoid receptors: basal ganglia, baso-lateral amygdala (but not central 
amygdala (Katona et al. 2001)), hippocampus and cerebellum. 
 
The fast synaptic weakening needed for implementing the associative itinerancy that searches 
the strong attractors (and makes the chaotic dream narrative) could be based in short-time 
mechanisms like DSE and DSI (Wilson et al. 2001; Sullivan, 2000). Notice that when the pre 
and post-synaptic cells are depolarized, the synaptic efficiency is diminished by DES, in an anti-
Hebbian way. Similarly, if an inhibitory (GABAergic) pre-synaptic cell is silent when the post-
synaptic cell is depolarized, DIS also produces anti-Hebbian synaptic weakening (because anti-
correlation should induce an increase, not a decrease, of inhibitory efficiency). So, we think that 
some kind of anti-Hebbian process may be based in the cannabinoid system. However, a 
detailed account of such anti-Hebbian mechanism is lacking (probably because no 
experimentalist searched for it). 
 
The fact that endocannabinoids also interfere with long term memory formation (by preventing 
both LTP and LTD, synapse formation etc.) means that the cannabinoid system also could be, in 
principle, the basis for long-term anti-Hebbian unlearning. However, more research must be 
done about this point since what we need is not blocking of long term memory formation, but 
weakening of already consolidated memory traces. We suggest that, when searching for such 
anti-Hebbian phenomena, it would be preferable to study associative LTP/LTD, that is, synaptic 
changes dependent on the temporal order between pre and post-synaptic depolarization (Bi & 
Poo 2001) instead of the usual tetanus induced LTP/LTD.  
 
At the behavioral level, the ansiolitic and (indirect) rewarding properties of cannabinoids could 
function as a positive context to be associated with the fear cues present in the dream. The 
organism would learn to associate previous fear cues with non-aversive outcomes, like in 
desensitization therapy (Marks & Tobena 1990). For example, the instinctive human fear of 
falling can turn out obsessive (acrophobia). Falling dreams and flying dreams, associated with 
cannabinoid effects, could provide extinction of this fear, like the extinction of fear observed in 
people addicted to role-coasters or parachuting.  
 
So, we can elaborate a strong and a weak unlearning hypothesis: in the strong hypothesis, true 
anti-Hebbian unlearning weakens the part of the synaptic matrix that stabilizes strong patterns 
and associations (for example, fear-learning responses). However, such exact anti-Hebbian 
mechanism needs yet to be found experimentally. In the weak hypothesis, we have usual 
extinction phenomenon, that is, association of fear cues to a non-aversive (or even rewarding) 
outcome elicited by endocannabinoids and opioids liberated during REM-sleep. 
 
V. Some predictions and experimental tests of the unlearning hypothesis 
  
Our two related hypothesis for REM-sleep/dream function (neurological role = weakening of 
over stable attractors, behavioral role = emotional habituation performed during simulated 
exploratory behavior), beyond providing a more inclusive account of the experimental data than 
the MCH, has indeed strong predictive power. We discuss in the following some general 
predictions and some specific experimental suggestions. 
 
Prediction 1: Extinction of fear learning is made at the amygdalar complex during REM-
sleep/dreams. 
 
Fear learning extinction should be more effective after REM-sleep periods. The neurochemical 
agents that mediate the extinction process should be produced during REM-sleep. In particular, 
we proposed that endocannabinoids mediate synaptic weakening and unlearning in the baso-
lateral amygdala during REM-sleep. Their presence should be experimentally detectable, 
perhaps by following the methods of Murillo-Rodriguez (1998; 2001; 2001b). 
 
Prediction 2: There should be spatial correlation between the CB1 receptor density and 
plastic regions highly activated during REM-sleep. 
 
This correlation is already visible comparing a list of regions that densely express CB1 
receptors with a list of regions that are strongly activated by REM-sleep. But a finer spatial 
analysis could be done, for example by using the amygdalar CB1 density measured by Katona 
et al. (2001). 
 
Prediction 3: Dream amnesia reflects the unlearning process and is mediated by 
endocannabinoids. 
 
Dream amnesia is a natural effect under the Unlearning Hypothesis but seems to be misplaced 
in the context of Memory Consolidation Hypothesis. Contrasting to MCH, anti-correlation 
between REM density and dream recall should be expected: less REM means less 
endocannabinoids and better memory formation. Preliminary evidence of such phenomena has 
been reported by Pace-Schott et al. (2001). One also could test if cannabinoids antagonists 
produce better remembering of dream content. 
 
Prediction 4: REM-sleep and dreaming are not critical to cognitive performance. 
 
In contrast to MCH, our primary role for REM-sleep in the mature brain (control of anxiety and 
obsessive states, emotional unlearning) are not cognitive. Extensive REM-blockade (say, by 
phenelzine (Landolt & Boer 2001)) with mild cognitive impairments is conceivable under the 
Unlearning Hypothesis, since the drug substitutes REM-sleep in its presumed anti-obsessive 
properties. So, the apparently harmless phenelzine REM-blockade is strong counter evidence to 
MCH (Vertes & Eastman 2000) but seems to be not counter evidence at all to the Unlearning 
Hypothesis. 
 
The postulated behavioral role for dreaming brings long term advantages to the organism, 
enabling the emergence of dream narrative by natural selection, but can be skipped during 
laboratory times without detectable loss. Notice the difference between critical biological 
functions (like memory consolidation) and functions not critical for short-term functioning as 
exploratory behavior. Exploratory behavior (real or simulated) brings emotional robustness and 
consequent survival advantage to organisms, but temporary absence of exploratory activity is 
not very much damaging.  
 
Prediction 5: Excessive REM-sleep impairs memory consolidation. 
 
Although REM-sleep deprivation probably is not so harmful, REM-sleep excess could impair 
memory by unlearning what should not be unlearned. This is a clear prediction of the 
computational model. It is also known that excess of cannabinoids impairs memory. Memory 
consolidation in rats has been impaired after REM-sleep enhancement due to Anandamide 
(Murillo-Rodriguez et al. 1998; 2001) and Oleamide (Murillo-Rodriguez et al. 2001b).  
 
We need to have some caution about this prediction, however, because the biological system 
probably has safeguards to such potential danger. For example, the CB1 receptors desensitize 
under high endocannabinoids concentration after two hours (Kouznetsova et al. 2002), so 
unlearning may be stopped by this receptor desensitization. Is this desensitization time that sets 
the need for several 90 minutes REM-sleep cycles interleaved with non-REM sleep for recovery 
of CB1 receptors? 
 
Prediction 6: REM-sleep is essential for developmental synaptic pruning. 
 
There exists recent evidence that developmental synaptic pruning occurs on synapses previously 
weakened by Hebbian processes (Colman et al. 1997). REM-sleep could be critical for such 
phenomena by performing this preliminary weakening. For example, it is known that the 
formation of ocular dominance (which depends on synaptic loss and axonal withdraw) is 
delayed by REM-sleep blockade (Marks et al. 1995). In our interpretation, this delay reflects the 
fact that synapses have not been properly weakened by REM-sleep.   
 
The Unlearning Hypothesis predicts that one should observe temporal anti-correlation between 
the REM-sleep density curve and the synaptic density curve during the developmental process. 
If the cannabinoid hypothesis is also correct, then one should have correlation between the CB1 
receptor density and massive pruning phenomena. The connection between REM-sleep and 
synaptic pruning could also be tested by examining the effect REM-sleep suppression during 
pruning epochs.  
 
Prediction 7: Highly plastic tissues like amygdala and hippocampus should turn out more 
prone to seizures in the absence of REM sleep. 
 
Seizures produce strong correlated Hebbian activity that should induce LTP, turning the seizure 
state a more stable attractor. If REM-sleep detects and weakens strong attractors, then it should 
have some role in the control of seizures. There is evidence of exacerbation of seizures after 
REM-blockade (Ehrenberg 2000). There is also some evidence that cannabinoids have anti-
epileptic properties (Wallace et al. 2001). Notice that MCH, being a cognitive hypothesis, has 
nothing to say about REM-sleep and seizures.  
 
Prediction 8: Replaying games is done to unlearn them. 
 
Dreams as virtual exploratory behavior explains why some activities idiosyncratic to modern 
humans (for example, visual spatial games: chess, Tetris, video games) are easily induced in 
dreams and hypnagogic imagery after intensive training (Stickgold et al. 2000). Similar to 
dreams, these spatial games strongly activates hippocampal memory, visual cortex, motor 
cortex, basal ganglia and cerebellum. But, contrasting to MCH, we view these dream and 
hypnagogic imagery as regulatory mechanisms: repetitive and strong learning protocols induce 
excessive plasticity that must be reversed by unlearning (and endocannabinoids). We also notice 
that the chess or Tetris scenarios dreamed are not simple replays of recent experience but 
stereotyped experiences full of anxiety: the blocks do not fall at the right places; the chess 
positions configure aversive situations or difficult problems. So, we suggest that if we add to the 
learning protocol some aversive outcomes (like some punishment for errors in Tetris training) 
the probability of related hypnagogic imagery should be increased. This could be quantified by 
experimental measurements like those made by Stickgold et al. (2000).  
 
Prediction 9: Weak associations are strengthened and strong associations are weakened 
during REM-sleep. 
 
The computational model suggests that not only the stability of strong patterns (associations) is 
weakened, but also, at the same time, the stability of weak patterns (associations) is enhanced. 
Recently, such phenomenon has been detected by Stickgold and co-workers (1999): after REM-
sleep, weak priming (association between low related words) is enhanced and strong priming 
(association between strongly related words) is weakened.  
 
Prediction 10: Dream acceleration should occur during REM-sleep. 
 
The unlearning procedure, by diminishing the stability of patterns, produces an acceleration 
phenomenon. This means that the frequency of transition between the meta-stable states grows 
with time. Notice that this is not a particular feature of the model, but it should be present in any 
itinerant dynamics where attractor stabilities are slowly weakened.  
 
A similar phenomenon has been previously observed by Anderson and Kawamoto in a model 
with anti-Hebbian synaptic dynamics (Kawamoto & Anderson 1985). Anderson and Kawamoto 
linked the transient acceleration phenomenon presented by their model with the psychological 
acceleration observed in visual bistability phenomena. This transient acceleration is due to the 
accumulation of the anti-Hebbian terms until a stationary state is achieved. Here we make a 
similar claim, and suggest that the so called dreaming acceleration is due to the increasing 
facility for escaping weakened patterns.  
 
Replay of rat hippocampal ensembles is done at a faster pace in non-REM sleep (McNaughton 
2000). We predict that the same phenomenon should occur during REM-sleep and that slower 
replay never shall be observed. Suggestion: recently Nicolelis and co-workers have implanted 
arrays of hundred of electrodes in the motor cortex of mammals and obtained strong correlation 
between collective firing patterns and animal movements (Nicolelis 2001; Kralik et al. 2001). 
The spatio-temporal pattern coding advocated by Nicolelis is similar to the used in this work. 
We predict that if REM-sleep is studied in Nicolelis experimental setup, one should observe a 
variety of meaningful motor patterns (full simulations, not simple replays). We also predict that 
these patterns might be activated at a faster pace at the final of the REM-sleep cycle. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This work intended to be an interdisciplinary study, an intellectual collaboration between a 
biological physicist (OK) and a psychologist (RRK). Our primary intention is not to present 
new experimental results but to draw a framework that reorganizes the known facts and 
suggests new directions for research. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:  
 
a) An improved computational model for implementing Crick-Mitchison’s ideas. 
 
To our knowledge, anti-Hebbian synaptic regulation has not been explored as a driving 
mechanism in itinerant memory models. Our James Machine, after recalling the immediate 
pattern induced by the inputs, starts to recall related patterns, wandering and exploring the 
associative space. In the absence of external inputs, this itinerant process is the dominant 
dynamics of the network (“the dreaming state”). The coupling of such chaotic associative 
dynamics with a long term anti-Hebbian mechanism furnishes a robust and efficient way to 
control over imprinted patterns. The model solves an important weak point of Crick-Mitchison 
original formulation (absence of dream narrative), is compatible with the idea that “dreaming is 
a royal road to emotionally charged processes” and produces novel qualitative predictions.  
 
Itinerancy based in anti-Hebbian synaptic dynamics (the James Machine) also seems to be 
superior to Horn and Adachi-Aihara models because it eliminates the fast oscillations between 
patterns and anti-patterns. The model predicts not only that strong associations are weakened, 
but also that weak associations (not visited during the dream) are enhanced, like recently found 
by Stickgold et al. (1999). Another important prediction is the acceleration phenomena that 
occur during unlearning: it gives a mechanistic account of acceleration in dreams and faster 
replay of hippocampal cells (McNaughton 2000).   
 
b) An improved hypothesis for REM-sleep function. 
 
Our neurological hypothesis about REM-sleep conceives it as a part a homeostatic circuit that 
weakens strong attractors in plastic brain tissues. At the developmental level, unlearning might 
be critical to massive synaptic pruning mechanisms that shape the mature brain. At the 
behavioral level, unlearning strong attractors would reflect in homeostasis of anxiety and 
control of obsessive states and other stereotyped brain activity. 
 
c) A neurobiological hypothesis for the unlearning mechanism. 
 
We also observed that the cannabinoid system seems to be a prime candidate to furnish the 
neurobiological basis both for the itinerant dynamics and the unlearning process. Short-term 
suppression of synaptic efficiency by endocannabinoids is similar to our fast anti-Hebbian 
factor. A long term unlearning mechanism is conceivable given the known memory modulation 
properties of endocannabinoids. The connection between the cannabinoid system and REM-
sleep is known and this interaction could be enhanced by the sleep inductor cannabinoid 
Oleamide. We recognize, however, that the specific cannabinoid-based unlearning mechanism 
needs yet to be fully formulated. 
 
d) An improved evolutionary hypothesis for dream narrative emergence. 
 
Our evolutionary hypothesis about the emergence of dream narrative is that, by recurrent 
exposition to simulated aversive scenarios, mammals (and birds) improve their emotional 
response to aversive situations without exposing themselves to the risks present in real 
scenarios. This hypothesis is similar to Revonsuo's Threat Simulation Theory and several 
arguments for its plausibility can be found in Revonsuo writings. Contrasting to Revonsuo, we 
stress the weakening (unlearning) of fear, anxiety and other emotional responses, instead of 
consolidation (learning) of survival skills.  
 
Hobson and McCarley tried to correlate features of dream imagery with spontaneously activated 
regions during REM-sleep. Here we try to answer why these specific regions and not others 
have been selected by evolution to be activated in the REM-sleep process. The 
evolutionary/behavioral role connects with the neurological role because circuits linked to 
exploratory behavior (locomotor system, cerebellum, hippocampus, amygdala) are the most 
susceptible to excessive plasticity.  
 
We feel that a strong point of our proposal is that it rescues dream narrative from its conceptual 
isolation. Instead of an idiosyncratic, weird phenomenon, dreams would be integrated into a 
larger set of animal behaviors like exploration and play. We suggest that, since in our theory 
play and dreams perform similar functions, one could search for phylogenetic correlation 
between time spent in dreaming and time spent in playing.  
 
Indeed, it is possible to suggest that a primary drive for some recent cultural inventions 
(bedtime stories, literature, theatre and movies) is that they are dream-like, that is, mimic the 
habituation of emotional responses  (and perhaps evoke the same endocannabinoid 
recompenses) already performed by the biological process of dreaming.  Notice that, in some 
cultures, telling dreams occupy the same cultural niche of telling stories and myths. Even the 
infantile expectancy for happy ends after the characters confront aversive and emotionally 
charged situations may reflect that dream-like biological motivation, to despair of artistic film 
makers. “Cinema as a fabric of dreams” (Goddard) would not be a superficial analogy: 
paraphrasing Hobson and McCarley, movies could be defined as a mental experience, occurring 
in the dark, which is characterized by hallucinoid imagery, predominantly visual and often 
vivid; by bizarre elements due to such spatiotemporal distortions as condensation, 
discontinuity, and acceleration; and by a temporary acceptance (suspension of disbelief) of 
these phenomena as “real” at the time that they occur. We wonder if brain scanning images of 
subjects watching (action or terror) movies would reveal dreaming-like patterns of brain activity 
as high activation of amygdala and low activation of pre-frontal lobes. 
 
e) An improved reevaluation of James dynamical ideas. 
 
Modern advocates of the dynamical approach in Psychology are tributary to James tentative of 
rescuing the study of thought processes from simplistic accounts based in atomic symbol 
manipulation. His fundamental idea that a better analogue to the thought flux is a complex 
stream is surprisingly contemporaneous (Freeman 2000; 2001). Moreover, James emphasis on 
the multitude of unstable equilibria and punctuated transitions, characteristic of dynamical 
systems with many degrees of freedom and several time scales, illustrate a more proper 
framework to model the thought flux than approaches naively inspired in low-dimensional 
deterministic chaos (van Gelder 1998). 
 
Our James Machine is a physical extended system with many degrees of freedom where 
macroscopic patterns of activity appear only to lead to the next ones in an incessant flux. 
Pursuing James stream analogy, one could remember that the complexity of actual river basins 
is due to two competing factors. A strong flux produces erosion that creates facilitated channels 
to follow (a “learning” effect). If this kind of positive feedback were the unique important 
factor, the river would follow its same obsessive ways again and again. But erosion also leads to 
the elevation and weakening of deep channels (an “unlearning” process), creating all the 
meandering complexity of a river basin. With Crick and Mitchison, we suggest that REM-sleep 
and dreams are related to a similar homeostatic mechanism in brain plasticity. Although the 
proper concepts could not be used in a rigorous way by James, his scientific intuition and 
literary skill enabled him to state in today easily recognizable terms that it is the combination of 
chaotic itinerancy and long term plasticity that prevents our Herakleitian thoughts from 
recurring twice.  
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